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Resumen 
 
Este trabajo aporta nuevos argumentos sobre los determinantes de la calidad institucional. De for-
ma previa a la exposición del trabajo empírico, se discuten los criterios que deberían valorar la 
calidad de las instituciones. Posteriormente, se identifican los factores que conforme a estos crite-
rios, determinan la calidad institucional. Los resultados obtenidos en el modelo estimado permiten 
inferir algunas conclusiones interesantes. La primera, que el nivel de desarrollo determina la cali-
dad institucional: cuanto mayor es la primera, más alta es la segunda. En segundo lugar, la distri-
bución del ingreso parece condicionar la calidad de las instituciones. Se requiere cierto grado de 
cohesión social para dotar de legitimidad y predictibilidad a las instituciones. En tercer lugar, un 
sistema impositivo adecuado se asocia positivamente con la mejora de la calidad institucional. Los 
impuestos proporcionan las rentas necesarias para generar calidad institucional, al mismo tiempo 
que crean una relación más estrecha y exigente entre el Estado y los ciudadanos. Finalmente, la 
educación mejora la calidad institucional. Por el contrario, algunas de las variables identificadas en 
la literatura, bien parecen no identificar la calidad institucional o bien tienen efectos indirectos, a 
través de las variables mencionadas. 
 
Palabras clave: Calidad institucional, distribución de ingresos, impuestos, educación. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper provides new evidences about the determinants of institutional quality. Prior to imple-
menting our empirical research, we discuss the criteria that should be used to judge the quality of 
institutions. Then, we identify the factors that, according to these criteria, determine institutional 
quality. The results obtained in the estimated model enable to draw some interesting conclusions. 
First of all, development level determines institutional quality: the highest the former, the highest 
the latter. Secondly, income distribution seems to condition institutional quality. A certain degree 
of social cohesion is needed to provide institutional predictability and legitimacy. Thirdly, a sound 
tax system is positively asso-ciated with institutional quality improvement. Taxes provide the ne-
cessary revenue to ge-nerate quality institutions, while creating a narrower and more demanding 
relation between State and citizens. Finally, education improves institutional quality. On the con-
trary, some of the variables identified in the literature either they do not seem to determine institu-
tional quality or their effects are indirect, through the aforementioned variables. 
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1. Introduction   
Economists tend to identify the causes of de-
velopment on the grounds of resource en-
dowment and technology. In essence, modern 
growth theory responds to this notion. Unlike 
this vision, a new perspective, not necessarily 
incompatible, has emerged in last decades. 
This perspective insists on the relevancy that 
normative framework and institutions have on 
fostering development. The institutional struc-
ture defines incentives and penalties, shapes 
social behaviour and articulates collective ac-
tion, thus conditioning development. In last 
years, a myriad of empirical studies has sup-
ported this relationship between institutional 
quality and development; and, though less 
conclusively, the one between institutional 
quality and growth (Aron, 2000). The positive 
impact of institutional quality on development 
has been pointed out by crossed section analy-
ses (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 
2002; Rodrik et al., 2002; or Easterly and Le-
vine) as well as case studies (for example, 
Rodrik, 2003). 
 
However, from an economic policy viewpoint 
it is not sufficient to acknowledge that institu-
tions do matter. It is also necessary to identify 
the determinants of institutional quality. This 
is a crucial task in order to implement policies 
aimed at building better institutions. Never-
theless, empirical research is scarcer in this 
area and its conclusions are less tenable. This 
is partly due to the difficulties faced by empiri-
cal work. More precisely, it faces i) deficient 
institutional quality indicators; ii) problems 
stemming from endogenous variables; iii) col-
linearity among the potentially explanatory 
variables preventing them from being consid-
ered independent factors; and iv) the possible 
presence of omitted variables that can bias the 
parameters estimated. 
 
The simplifying conception that economists 
have been assuming on institutions in their 
modelling also hinders empirical research. 
Institutions are often considered to be efficient 
responses to transaction costs. It is supposed 
that agents operate exclusively driven by ra-
tional optimization criteria, that social dyna-
mics get rid of inefficient institutions and that 
the existing ones improve social welfare. As a 
consequence, there is no problem whatsoever 
in defining "ideal institutions" - the ones of 
the successful countries - and in transplanting 
them to other nations. These premises have 
inspired a good part of international donors’ 
institutional reform programs.   
 
Nevertheless, the failures shown by these insti-
tutional "transplant" policies indicate that 
institutions do not work if they are not capable 
of shaping agents behaviour in an effective 
manner. This proposition underlines the rele-
vance of legitimacy (or credibility) of institu-
tions and their highly specific nature regarding 
the particular context in which they operate. 
Therefore, the fact that an institution prevails 
does not mean that it promotes socially effi-
cient behaviours. Institutions are also struc-
tures of power that articulate and reflect hie-
rarchical relations. Far from being always effi-
cient social options, institutions are often in-
terest-driven creations used by those who have 
the power to establish rules (North, 1993). 
 
In spite of these difficulties, some studies have 
identified variables determining institutional 
quality. Some of these determinants are out of 
the reach of economic policy, such as country 
geographical location, colonial origin, legal 
system tradition, ethno-linguistic fragmenta-
tion or natural resources endowment. Yet, 
these variables often lose significance when 
they are controlled for level of development. 
Some other studies have explained institu-
tional quality in terms of determinants more 
directly related to economic and social op-
tions, such as income distribution, interna-
tional openness or education. 
 
This paper provides new evidences about the 
determinants of institutional quality. Prior to 
implementing our empirical research, we dis-
cuss the criteria that should be used to judge 
the quality of institutions. Then, we identify 
the factors that, according to these criteria, 
determine institutional quality. The results 
obtained in the estimated model enable to 
draw some interesting conclusions. First of all, 
as it was expected, development level deter-
mines institutional quality: the highest the 
former, the highest the latter. Secondly, in-
come distribution seems to condition institu-
tional quality. A certain degree of social cohe-
sion is needed to provide institutional predict-
ability and legitimacy. Thirdly, a sound tax 
system is positively associated with institu-
tional quality improvement. Taxes provide the 
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necessary revenue to generate quality institu-
tions, while creating a narrower and more 
demanding relation between State and citizens. 
Finally, education improves institutional qual-
ity. It determines the innovation capacity and 
the dynamic efficiency of institutions. On the 
contrary, some of the variables identified in 
the literature either they do not seem to de-
termine institutional quality or their effects are 
indirect, through the aforementioned vari-
ables. 
 
The remainder of paper is organized as fol-
lows. In section two, institutional quality crite-
ria are discussed. Section three identifies the 
variables that are supposed to explain institu-
tional quality. In section four we develop our 
empirical analysis for a wide sample of coun-
tries, identifying the determinants of institu-
tional quality. In section five  each determi-
nant contribution is computed. Section six 
tests the results found by using alternative 
institutional quality indicators, confirming 
that they are acceptably robust relationships. 
Finally, the main conclusions are considered 
in last section. 
 
2. Criteria of institutional 
quality 
 
In last two decades, a myriad of studies have 
explored the role of institutions in develop-
ment. To make this possible, a considerable 
number of institutional quality indicators have 
been elaborated by multilateral organisations, 
risk-rating agencies, academic institutions and 
non-governmental organizations. Given the 
extent of the available repertoire, it is not sur-
prising that their characteristics and quality 
levels greatly differ among indicators. Never-
theless, most of them lack a theoretical frame-
work linking the indicator to previously de-
fined institutional quality criteria. What does it 
define the quality of an institution? To re-
spond to this question, we must consider the 
functions an institution fulfils. 
 
As Greif (2006) argued, institutions might be 
defined as a set of social factors, rules, beliefs, 
values and organizations that jointly motivate 
regularity in individual and social behaviour. 
Thus, institutions can be seen as an inter-
temporary contract that shapes behaviours; or 
seeking out another simile (Aoki, 2000) as a 
system of shared beliefs about the equilibrium 
of a game played repeatedly. Therefore, good 
institutions will be those that stimulate agents’ 
activities with a high social return. Thus, they 
will draw together private and social returns, 
assuring a more efficient collective effort allo-
cation. On the other hand, deficient institu-
tions are those that stimulate socially useless 
or unproductive behaviours. 
 
Since institutions do not really work if they are 
not capable of shaping behaviours, in order to 
evaluate them, it is important to analyze not 
only the rules that institutions define, but also 
the individuals’ motivations to fulfil them. 
Therefore, so relevant it is to study the incen-
tives framework in which the agents operate as 
why they behave according to them. It is ne-
cessary to know why some rules are observed 
while some others are not. Hence, the legiti-
macy of institutions becomes a basic feature 
conditioning its efficiency. 
 
Institutions respond to problems that social 
interaction rises up in an uncertain world. In 
this context, institutions constitute a mecha-
nism to reduce discretional behaviours and to 
limit opportunism. In addition, since they 
shape social behaviours, institutions foster 
social interaction and collective action, reduc-
ing coordination costs. Yet, it would be mis-
taken to suppose that institutions always en-
dure a rational response to social transaction 
costs. They are also a mechanism through 
which social actors express their strategies. 
Hence, a society does not have necessarily all 
institutions it needs nor are the existing ones 
necessarily optimal.   
 
According to this approach, institutions have 
two economic basic functions: on the one 
hand, reducing transaction costs, granting 
certainty and predictability to social interac-
tion; on the other hand, easing economic 
agents’ coordination. If these functions are 
kept in mind, institutional quality must be 
defined by four basic criteria. 
 
· Static efficiency: the institution capacity to be 
incentive-compatible. In other words, it is the 
capacity to promote behaviours that reduce 
social costs. 
 
· Credibility (or legitimacy): the institution 
capacity to define inter-temporary credible 
contracts. That is to say, it is the institution’s 
ability to generate a normative framework that 
truly determines agents’ conduct. 
 
· Security (or predictability): an institution 
fulfils its function if it reduces the uncertainty 
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associated with human interaction. In fact, one 
of the institutional functions is to grant a 
higher level of safety and stability to social 
relations by diminishing transaction costs. 
 
Adaptability (or dynamic efficiency): This is to 
say, institutional ability to be able to anticipate 
social changes or at least to generate the incen-
tives that facilitate agents’ adjustment to these 
changes. 
 
These criteria can inspire analytical explora-
tion and empirical work seeking out variables 
that determine institutional quality. In the 
following sections, a model will be constructed 
and estimated by incorporating variables re-
lated to the four criteria previously defined. 
 
3. Determinants of institu-
tional quality 
 
As mentioned, the study of institutions faces 
the limited reliability of the available institu-
tional quality indicators (Arndt and Oman, 
2006). This lack of reliability compels to be 
cautious in the interpretation of the results 
stemming from empirical research. In our 
opinion, the World Bank Governance Indica-
tors average (GIs) is the best available proxy 
for institutional quality, not only for its greater 
accuracy, but also for its wider geographical 
coverage1. However, the results obtained in 
our research by using this proxy as the de-
pendent variable have been tested by employ-
ing separately the six components of the GIs 
and alternative indicators. 
 
As far as the explanatory variables are con-
cerned, these were selected on the basis of 
their relation to those institutional quality 
criteria previously defined: static efficiency, 
dynamic efficiency, predictability and legiti-
macy. According to these criteria, development 
level is identified, as one of the first clearer 
explanatory variables, which operates on insti-
tutional quality through both supply and de-
mand. Firstly, it determines the availability of 
resources to build good institutions. Secondly, 
it generates a larger demand for quality institu-
tions. It is a determinant related to the static 
efficiency of institutions. In addition, the posi-
tive relationship between both variables has 
been confirmed by previous research (Chong 
                                                 
1 See Kaufman et al. (2006) for a methodological description of 
the Governance Indicators. For a discussion of their shortcom-
ings, see Arndt and Oman (2006) 
 
and Zanforlinm 2000, Islam and Montenegro, 
2002, or Rigobon and Rodrik, 2004, among 
others). 
 
Income distribution is the second variable 
considered. It allegedly affects both institu-
tional predictability and legitimacy. Firstly, 
because a strong inequality causes divergent 
interests among different social groups, which, 
in turn, leads to conflicts, socio-political insta-
bility and insecurity. Secondly, inequality fa-
cilitates that institutions remain captured by 
groups of power, whose actions are orientated 
to particular interests rather than to the com-
mon good. Thirdly, it diminishes social agents’ 
disposition to cooperative action and favours 
corruption and rent-seeking activities. Also 
this relationship is supported by previous 
studies (Alesina and Rodrik, 1993; Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996; or Easterly, 2001); though in 
some cases the results depend on the inclusion 
of regional dummies (for example, in Islam 
and Montenegro, 2002, the relationship disap-
pears once Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa regional dummies are incorporated in 
the model estimated). In addition, Engerman 
and Sokoloff (1997, 2002, 2005 and 2006) 
argue that a very unequal income distribution 
encourage institutions that, in turn, tend to 
perpetuate inequality, thus generating a vi-
cious circle between inequality and low insti-
tutional quality. 
 
International openness is the third factor that 
can encourage institutional quality. It is re-
lated to the dynamic efficiency of institutions. 
Firstly, it creates a more dynamic, sophisti-
cated and demanding environment, which 
fuels a larger demand for good institutions. 
Secondly, international openness encourages a 
more competitive environment, therefore it 
can hinder rent-seeking activities, corruption 
and nepotism. Finally, openness can facilitate 
learning processes and good practices imita-
tion from other countries experience. Refer-
ences to this variable are abundant, though 
with not totally coincidental results. For ex-
ample, Rodrik et al. (2002) confirm that open-
ness has a positive impact on institutional 
quality, but their estimates do not control for 
development level. Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) 
find a positive relationship, though weak, be-
tween trade openness and the rule of law, but 
the relationship becomes negative in case of 
democracy. The authors interpret this para-
doxical result in terms of distributive tensions 
generated by economic openness. Also Islam 
and Montenegro (2002) state that, when con-
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trolling for development level, openness affects 
some institutional quality variables but not 
others. Finally, the work of Knack and Azfar 
(2000), referred to corruption, shows that the 
results are very sensitive to the country sample 
used. 
 
Education is the fourth factor considered as a 
determinant of institutional quality. It is a 
variable related to institutions dynamic effi-
ciency. A more educated population demands 
more transparent and dynamic institutions and 
permits to build them. This is a variable sel-
dom considered in empirical research. As an 
exception, the work of Alesina and Perotti 
(1996), which confirms the positive impact of 
education on institutional quality, must be 
pointed out. Also, in the literature on corrup-
tion, the education effect has been detected in 
works as those of Glaeser and Sacks (2006) or 
Evans and Rauch (2000).   
 
Finally, the fifth determinant of institutional 
quality has not been, to our knowledge, taken 
into account by previous studies. Yet, it is a 
crucial variable that affects both the static effi-
ciency and the legitimacy of institutions: taxes. 
A sound tax system not only provides the nec-
essary resources to build high quality institu-
tions, but also enables the consolidation of a 
social contract that gives rise to a more de-
manding relationship between state and citi-
zens. As a result, there will be higher transpar-
ency and accountability, which leads to better 
institutional quality (Tilly, 1992; Moore, 
2002). This may not happen with public reve-
nues collected from other sources such as 
state-owned companies or natural resources. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned variables, 
we have also taken into account some other 
determinants traditionally considered in the 
literature related to countries’ “historical” fea-
tures. In particular, several authors have noted 
that ethno-linguistic fragmentation can influ-
ence negatively on institutional quality. 
Greater heterogeneity may fuel tensions and 
conflicts between different groups, reduce 
social cooperation and generate a mismatch 
between formal and informal institutions. 
Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. 
(2003) or Easterly et al. (2006) found evidence 
supporting this hypothesis. However, when 
controlling for development level, this rela-
tionship largely lost its significance, as re-
vealed by Alesina et al. (2003) or Islam and 
Montenegro (2002). 
 
A country's legal system origin is another ele-
ment that has been identified as a potential 
determinant of institutional quality. It is ar-
gued that the British origin system and to a 
lesser extent German or Scandinavian systems, 
is based on a greater recognition of economic 
freedom, which limits the state intervention in 
the economy. On the contrary, the French 
origin legal system and even more the Soviet 
system were designed to determine the state's 
ability to organize economic and social life, 
leading to a weaker recognition of property 
rights and individual freedom. Accordingly, 
British and Nordic legal traditions are ex-
pected to be associated with higher institu-
tional quality. Authors such as La Porta et al. 
(1999), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), Chong 
and Zanforlin (2000) or Easterly and Levine 
(2003) find empirical support for this hy-
pothesis. In the latter case, however, they do 
not control for development level. 
 
Some authors suggest that for former colonies, 
the ways of colonization may have been influ-
enced their institutional quality. While the 
arguments provided are not always consistent, 
it is assumed that UK colonization has been 
less noxious than others, since it has favoured 
the emergence of an institutionalism better 
prepared to undertake a market economy. This 
approach precludes that fact that even a single 
metropolis could have pursued different mod-
els of dominance in its various colonies, for 
example, the UK in the United States, India or 
Nigeria. It is, however, a controversial rela-
tionship, confirmed by some authors (Acemo-
glu et al., 2001; or, in case of corruption, 
Treisman, 2000) but denied by others (Alonso, 
2007). 
 
Institutional quality can also be influenced by 
geographical conditions. It is considered that a 
country location in the tropics, lack of access 
to the sea, or soil fertility may have influenced 
the development of strong quality institutions. 
This argument is supported by Gallup et al. 
(1998) or Easterly and Levine (2003), among 
others.  
 
Finally, valuable natural resources can also 
affect institutional quality. They can negatively 
affect institutions by fostering rent seeking 
activities and replacing tax revenues by other 
revenue sources less transparent and less sub-
ject to accountability. Sachs and Warner 
(1997) and Easterly and Levine (2003) con-
firmed this relationship, although in the latter 
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case they did not control for development 
level. 
 
4. The Model 
 
4.1 ENDOGENEITY  
 
Some of the determinants previously outlined 
are clearly exogenous, while others are poten-
tially endogenous. In that case, instrumental 
variables methodology must be used. It should 
be noted that the analysis that follows is not 
designed to provide a full analytical explana-
tion of the different variables, but only to test 
if they are endogenous and if so, to identify the 
potential instruments to be used2.  
 
Thus, per capita income was estimated by ap-
plying a traditional convergence equation 
where the dependent variable is 2004 per ca-
pita GDP. The explanatory variables are its 
lagged value in 1990 and institutional quality, 
controlling further for potential regional speci-
ficities (Table 1). As shown, institutional qual-
ity was found to be positive and significant, 
indicating that per capita income should be 
treated as an endogenous variable. As instru-
ments for it, we decided to use its lagged value 
in 1990 and the East Asia dummy, which also 
turned out to be significant (at 90% probabi-
lity). 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Appendix I for a description of the variables used in this 
paper. 
Income distribution is also a potentially en-
dogenous variable. The higher the institutional 
quality, the more equitable income distribu-
tion is. To study this possibility, we estimated 
an equation where the Gini index was made 
dependent on per capita GDP, its square value, 
institutional quality, ethnic fragmentation and 
regional dummies (Table 2). A nonlinear rela-
tionship between income distribution and per 
capita income was found. Middle-income 
countries have more unequal distributions 
than low and high income countries, thus cor-
roborating the Kuznets hypothesis. It was also 
found that the greater ethnic fragmentation, 
the most unequal income distribution is. In 
addition, three regional dummies were signifi-
cant: Europe and Central Asia (negative) and 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (posi-
tive). 
 
With respect to institutional quality, while the 
corresponding parameter shows the expected 
sign, it is not significant. Since this result may 
mask the existence of collinearity between 
institutional quality and per capita income, we 
estimated the same equation but dropping this 
last variable (column b, Table 2). The results 
show that institutional quality is significant. 
Given this result, we decided to consider in-
come distribution as an endogenous variable, 
selecting as instruments per capita income, its 
square value in 1990, ethnic fragmentation 
and three regional dummies. 
 
Table 1. Determinants of per capita income 
Variable Value t-ratio 
Constant 1,33 4.49 
Per capita GDP (1990) 0,86 24.48 
Institutional Quality (GIs average 2006) 0,26 4.48 
East Asia 0.21 2.18 
Instrumental Variables. Endogenous: GIs average 2006. Instrument: GIs average 1998 
Adjusted R2: 0.91. Observations: 160. Robust Estimate  
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Tax revenue is another variable that can be 
potentially endogenous, for institutional qual-
ity may influence the underlying fiscal con-
tract. To investigate this possibility, it was 
considered that tax revenue depends on per 
capita income, available natural resources and 
institutional quality. Firstly, a higher level of 
development increases both the demand for 
public expenditure and the capacity to pay 
taxes. Secondly, the existence of valuable natu-
ral resources represents an alternative source 
of public revenue, thus decreasing taxes. Fi-
nally, better institutions can increase tax reve-
nue because they lead to a better tax system 
design and improve tax administration capabi- 
lities. According to our estimates, per capita 
income and institutional quality, though 
showing the expected sign, are not significant 
when both variables are introduced simultane-
ously into the equation (Table 3, column a). 
However, they are individually significant 
when the other is removed from the equation 
(columns b and c). Since this suggests colli-
nearity problems, we decided to consider taxes 
as an endogenous variable. As instruments for 
tax revenue, fuel exports and two regional 
dummies, Latin America and South Asia, were 
selected. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Determinants of tax revenue 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Variable Value t-ratio Value t-ratio Value t-ratio 
Constant 2,10 1.92 2.99 70.53 0.63 1.69 
Per capita GDP  0.10 0.80   0.27 6.48 
Institutional Quality 0.24 1.62 0.34 8.79   
Fuel -0,02 1.55 -0.01 1.02 -0.03 1.71 
Latin America -0,16 1,72 -0.14 1.82 -0.22 2.92 
South Asia  -0,49 3,45 -0.45 3.80 -0.55 3.66 
Adjusted R2  0,37 0.38 0.32 
Nº Observations 120 124 120 
Endogenous 
Institutional Quality 
2006, per capita GDP 
2004 
Institutional Quality 
2006 
per capita GDP 
2004 
Instruments 
Institutional Quality 
1998, per capita GDP 
1990 
Quality Institutional 
1998 
per capita GDP 
1990 
(a) Per capita GDP is included. (b) Per capita GDP is excluded. (c) Institutional Quality is excluded.  
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates  
 
 
 
Table 2. Determinants of Gini Index 
 (a) (b) 
Variable Value t-ratio Value t-ratio 
Constant -1,90 1.51 3.6 147.28 
Per capita GDP  1,26 4,22   
(Per capita GDP)2 -0,07 3,99   
Institutional Quality  -0.05 0,93 -0.04 2.16 
Ethnic Fragmentation  0,01 2,62 0.01 1.99 
Europe & Central Asia  -0,16 3,94 -0.15 3.43 
Latin America  0,28 7,00 0.35 9.85 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0,34 5,74 0.21 4.09 
Adjusted R2  0,60 0.54 
Nº Observations 121 126 
Endogenous Institutional Quality 2006, per 
capita GDP 2004, (per capita 
GDP 2004)2 
Institutional Quality 2006 
Instruments Institutional Quality 1998, per 
capita GDP 1990, (Per capita 
GDP 1990)2 
Institutional Quality 1998 
(a) Per capita GDP is included. (b) Per capita GDP is excluded.  
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates  
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Also international openness may be an en-
dogenous variable associated with institutional 
quality. As its determinants, we considered per 
capita GDP, with a positive expected sign, 
population (negative) and institutional quality. 
According to the results, the corresponding 
parameters of per capita income and institu-
tional quality, though showing the expected 
sign, were not significant (Table 4, column a). 
Since this may be due to collinearity, the same  
Education could also be an endogenous vari-
able associated with institutional quality. Re-
plicating previous procedures, it was consid-
ered to be dependant on per capita income and 
institutional quality. According to our esti-
mates, while the former showed the expected 
sign and it was significant, the latter was not,  
and it showed a “negative” sign (table 5, co-
lumn a). However, faced with possible collin-
earity problems, the equation was re-estimated 
 
Table 4. Determinants of openness rate 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Variable Value t-ratio Value t-ratio Value t-ratio 
Constant 6,08 11.81 6.58 21.71 5.94 8.60 
Per capita GDP  0.07 1.28   0.08 2.50 
Institutional quality  0.03 0.33 0.14 2.82   
Population -0,16 8,61 -0.15 7.70 -0.15 8.60 
Eur. & Central Asia  0,28 3,62 0.28 4.03 0.28 3.78 
East Asia  0,34 2,59 0.08 0.36 0.34 2.67 
Adjusted R2  0,45 0.36 0.43 
Nº Observations 158 178 159 
Endogenous 
Institutional Quality 
2006, per capita 
GDP 2004 
Institutional Quality 
2006 
per capita GDP 
2004 
Instruments 
Institutional Quality 
1998, per capita 
GDP 1990 
Institutional Quality 
1998 
per capita GDP 
1990 
(a) Per capita GDP is included. (b) Per capita GDP is excluded. (c) Institutional Quality is excluded.  
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates 
 
equation was estimated by dropping one of 
these two variables (columns b and c). In this 
case, both were significant and showed the 
expected signs. Therefore, openness rate was 
considered as an endogenous variable, select-
ing as instruments population and regional 
dummies for East Asia and Europe and Central 
Asia. 
 
by eliminating per capita income. In this case, 
institutional quality was significant and 
showed a positive sign. Given this ambiguity, 
we decided to investigate the determinants of 
institutional quality considering education 
both as an endogenous and an exogenous vari-
able. 
 
Table 5. Determinants of education 
 (a) (b) 
Variable Value t-ratio Value t-ratio 
Constant -2,94 3.81 1.65 38.26 
Per capita GDP  0,53 6.06   
Institutional Quality  -0.15 1,55 0.45 11.51 
Adjusted R2  0,71 0.47 
Nº Observations 105 122 
Endogenous Institutional Quality 2006, per 
capita GDP 2004 
Institutional Quality 2006 
Instruments Institutional Quality 1998, per 
capita GDP 1990 
Institutional Quality 1998 
((a) Per capita GDP is included. (b) Per capita GDP is excluded. 
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates 
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Table 6. Determinants of institutional quality (I) 
Variable Value t- ratio 
Constant -4.58 9.43 
per capita GDP  0.50 7.82 
Ethnic fragmentation  0.01 1.12 
Former British colonies  0.18 1.63 
Former Spanish colonies -0.22 1.65 
Former French colonies  0.05 0.33 
British legal system  -0.09 0.86 
Geographic Location 1.43 3.52 
Fuel -0.11 0.64 
Middle East & North. Afr. -0.71 4.00 
Europe & Central Asia  -0.59 4.35 
Adjusted R2  0.77 
Nº Observations  127 
Endogenous: Per capita GDP 2004. Instruments: pc GDP 1990 
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates. Exactly Identified Equation  
 
The rest of the variables taken into account, 
ethnic fragmentation, legal system, colonial 
origin, geographical location or natural re-
sources were considered exogenous.    
 
 
4.2 THE ESTIMATED MODEL: RESULTS 
 
The econometric analysis of institutional qual-
ity faces the problem stemming from an exten-
sive list of potential explanatory factors and 
possible colinearity among some of them. 
Therefore, the variables were separated into 
two groups. On the one hand, those variables 
responding to "historical" features of coun-
tries, which are hardly malleable by govern-
ment action. On the other hand, those vari-
ables directly related to the previously defined 
quality institutional criteria: efficiency (static 
and dynamic), predictability and legitimacy. 
Regarding the first group, the estimated equa-
tion would be as follows: 
 
DiNRGLCOLSEFYIQ 654321 +β+β+β+β+β+β+α=
(1) 
 
 
 
where, for each country, IQ stands for institu-
tional quality; Y for development level; EF 
represents ethnic fragmentation; LS is the legal 
system tradition; CO stands for colonial origin; 
GL is geographic location; NR is natural re-
source endowment; and Di represents regional 
dummies. As previously indicated, we used the  
World Bank Governance Indicators average as 
a proxy for institutional quality. Development 
level was defined as (log) PPP per capita in-
come; ethnic fragmentation has been ap-
proached by an indicator constructed by 
Alesina et al. (2003); legal system origin, 
through dummies; colonial origin is taken 
from Laporta et al. (1999); geographic location 
is measured by countries distance to the tro-
pics, and natural resources by the share of fuel 
in total exports. 
 
Contrary to other studies, ethnic fragmenta-
tion, legal system origin and natural resource 
endowments were found not to be significant 
(Table 6). Although, this can partly be due to 
differences in the indicators and sample em-
ployed, it should be pointed out that the exist-
ing empirical evidence regarding these varia- 
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bles is not too conclusive. Parameters use to 
lose significance when estimations are con-
trolled for per capita income. Secondly, colo-
nial origin is only significant (at 90%) for for-
mer Spanish colonies. However, this result can 
cover up Latin America peculiarity concerning 
income distribution, which is a variable that 
crucially affects institutional quality, as it shall 
be seen later. Thirdly, a country's geographical 
location is the only factor within the so-called 
"historical” ones that is significant. Finally, 
Middle East and North Africa and Europe and 
Central Asia were the only regions showing 
institutional peculiarities (negative)3. 
 
The second estimated model directly responds 
to determinants related to the previously de-
fined institutional quality criteria. In particu-
lar, the estimated equation is: 
 
DiORβEdβTβGβYβαIQ 54321 ++++++=
 (2) 
 
where IQ stands for institutional quality; Y for 
development level; G is income distribution, 
measured by the Gini index; T represents tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP; Ed is educa-
tion; OR is openness rate; and Di are regional 
dummies. All explanatory variables, except for 
dummies, were transformed into logs to soften 
potential collinearity problems. The equation 
was estimated by instrumental variables, using 
as proxies those detailed in the previous sec-
tion. Regarding education, it was considered 
both an exogenous and an endogenous vari-
able. 
 
In the first case, the most relevant results are 
as follows (table 7, column a). Firstly, the 
equation estimated shows a relatively high R2 
(0.80), which implies that the variables chosen 
explain a large proportion of institutional 
quality differences across countries. Secondly, 
under and over-identification tests indicate 
that the instruments used are appropriate. The 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic is above the critical 
value of the corresponding χ2, while the J sta-
tistic falls under it. Thirdly, all variables show 
the expected sign and are significant, except 
openness rate. Finally, Middle East and North 
Africa and Europe and Central Asia were again 
                                                 
3 It was tested to separate this region into Europe, on the one 
hand and Central Asia, on the other. Both dummies were nega-
tive and significant, albeit the latter showed a slightly higher 
absolute value. It also must be noted that for clear outliers were 
identified: Zimbawe and Algeria (a lower institutional quality 
than estimated) and Bostwana and Chile (higher). Yet, results 
do not change if these countries are removed from the sample.  
the only regions to show institutional peculi-
arities (negative). Therefore, the results sug-
gest that a higher development level leads to 
higher institutional quality. As the latter also 
promotes economic development, this implies 
that these two variables interact and may lead 
to vicious or virtuous circles of institutional 
quality and growth. 
 
The Gini index significance implies that a 
more equitable income distribution improves a 
country institutional quality. Reversely, a con-
text of high social inequality leads to bad insti-
tutions. As indicated above, Islam and Monte-
negro (2002) considered that the Gini index 
significance disappears after introducing 
dummies for Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Our results do not confirm this result, 
although the two regions have reported sig-
nificant dummies in the Gini index estimate. 
These dummies are used as instruments in the 
institutional quality estimation.  
A sound tax system promotes institutional 
quality, since it provides the necessary public 
revenue to build good institutions, and it cre-
ates a more direct relationship between citi-
zens and state. As stated above, it is a crucial 
variable, as confirmed by our estimates, that 
has not been addressed previously in the lit-
erature. Regarding education, it impacts posi-
tively on institutional quality. This is another 
important variable that has hardly been taken 
into account. Finally, openness is the only 
variable that, though showing the right sign, is 
not significant. This result differs partly from 
other empirical research findings. However, 
the evidence is not entirely conclusive once 
controlling for development. 
 
If education is considered exogenous (table 7, 
column b), results are very similar, except that  
this variable and per capita income become 
significant at 90% instead of 95 %. 
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Table 7. Determinants of institutional quality (II) 
 (a) (b) 
Variable Value t-ratio Value t-ratio 
Constant -2,63 1.70 -2.64 1.76 
Per capita GDP  0.26 2.12 0.27 1.96 
Gini Index -0.75 2.40 -0.76 2.47 
Taxes 0.73 2.76 0.72 2.83 
Education 0,33 2.03 0,32 1.70 
Openness rate 0.12 1,04 0.12 1,04 
Middle East. & N. Afr. -0.59 2.49 -0.59 2.49 
Europe & Central Asia  -0.69 4.81 -0.69 4.73 
Adjusted R2 0,80 0.80 
Nº Observations 78 78 
Infra-identification test:  statistic Kleiber-
gen-Paap (χ2 value (6)) 14.88 (12.59) 14.00 (12.59) 
Statistic J (χ2 value (5)) 10.82 (11.07) 10.89 (11.07) 
Endogenous Per capita GDP 2004, Gini In-
dex, taxes and openness rate  
Per capita GDP 2004, Gini 
Index, taxes, education and 
openness rate  
Instruments Per capita GDP 1990, (Per 
capita GDP 1990)2, fuel ex-
ports, ethnic fragmentation, 
population and regional dum-
mies  
Per capita GDP 1990, (Per 
capita GDP 1990)2, fuel ex-
ports, education 1990, ethnic 
fragmentation, population and  
regional dummies 
(a) Education is considered as exogenous (b) Education is considered as enogenous 
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates 
 
In sum, empirical evidence suggests that insti-
tutional quality is determined by those vari-
ables more directly related to aforementioned 
four criteria. They are the criteria that define 
the quality of institutions. By contrast, “his-
torical” origin factors either seem to have no 
effect or their influence is indirectly exerted. 
Thus, institutional quality seems to be uncor-
related with the legal system origin or with the 
colonial origin4. Ethnic fragmentation affects 
institutional quality, but through income dis-
tribution, while natural resource endowment 
does it through its negative impact on tax 
revenue. Something similar happens with re-
gional dummies. Middle East and North Africa 
and Europe and Central Asia are the only two 
regions to show a peculiarity in their institu-
tions (negative). This does not mean, however, 
that there are no other regional specificities. 
They are manifested through the determinants 
of institutional quality, income distribution in 
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa or low 
tax collection in South Asia. 
                                                 
4 The colonial Spanish origin and geographical location were no 
longer significant if introduced into equation (2). In fact, the 
first of these variables seems to mask Latin American income 
distribution peculiarity, while the second seems to have an 
impact on per capita income. We also tested if religion, another 
institutional quality determinant proposed in the literature, had 
any explanatory power. Yet, we found no relationship whatso-
ever. 
5. The impact of institutional 
quality determinants  
 
It is possible to compute the impact of each 
institutional quality determinant by using the 
estimates of the previous section. Table 8 
shows in the first two columns the real and 
estimated GIs average for different groups of 
countries classified according to their income 
level. As shown, estimated values are more 
accurate for high and low income countries. 
The other four columns and first four rows 
reflect the contribution of each explanatory 
variable to the IGs averages. They are calcu-
lated by multiplying the estimated parameters 
by the value of the correspondent variable5. 
After adding up the constant, the (non-
significant) openness rate and regional dum-
mies contributions, these values coincide with 
the estimated indicator. As shown, the contri-
bution of each factor decreases as it does in-
come level. This is not the case for the Gini 
index, since middle-income countries, particu-
larly lower-middle income countries, show 
worse results than lower income countries.  
                                                 
5 All calculations have been made by using Table 7 estimates. 
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For all groups, education is the variable that 
has the lowest impact on institutional quality. 
In rich countries per capita income is the most 
relevant single factor, while for the rest, espe-
cially low income countries, is the Gini index. 
When analyzing the causes of institutional 
quality differences between developed and 
developing countries, interesting results 
emerge (last three rows of Table 8)6. In middle 
income countries, taxes are the variable with 
the largest contribution to this difference, fo-
llowed by income, Gini index, and education. 
In low income countries, per capita GDP and 
taxes are also by far the most important vari-
ables, followed by education and finally in-
come distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Total sum is under 100% because regional dummies and open-
ness rate are not included. 
 
Income distribution is the most powerful ex-
planatory variable in all regions if performing 
the same empirical exercise by geographical 
regions in developing countries. It is followed 
by per capita income in three regions (East 
Asia and Pacific, Latin America & Caribbean 
and South Asia) and taxes in the other three 
(table 9). Comparing institutional quality di-
fferences between rich and developing coun-
tries, per capita income turns out to be the 
most influential variable in only one region, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where it is responsible of 
36.8% of this difference, followed by taxes 
with 30.3%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Weight of institutional quality determinants 
   Contribution to GIe 
Income Level GI GIe Pc GDP Gini Taxes Education 
High 1.34 1.34 2.70 -2.61 2.64 0.74 
Upper Middle 0.17 0.28 2.44 -2.83 2.27 0.67 
Lower Middle -0.28 -0.38 2.25 -2.87 2.06 0.57 
Low -0.65 -0.65 1.98 -2.81 1.94 0.40 
Contribution to differences with respect to high income countries (%) 
Upper Middle  22.05 18.31 31.73 6.21 
Lower Middle  27.66 15.75 36.01 10.47 
Low  36.18 9.69 35.34 17.54 
GI- Governance Indicators average. GIe – Estimated average 
 
Table 9. Weight of institutional quality determinants 
   Contribution to GIe 
Geographic  
Location GI GIe 
Pc 
GDP  Gini Taxes Education ECA MENA 
EAP -0.26 -0.37 2.25 -2.86 1.89 0.56   
ECA 0.30 0.30 2.46 -2.60 2.53 0.71 -0.69  
LAC -0.21 -0.21 2.29 -2.96 2.03 0.58   
MENA -0.33 -0.33 2.27 -2.73 2.31 0.55  -0.69 
SA -0.74 -0.68 2.04 -2.68 1.70 0.39   
SAf -0.38 -0.36 2.07 -2.92 2.12 0.49   
Contribution to differences with respect to high income countries (%) 
AOP   28.17 15.45 47.35 11.51   
ECA   23.08 -1.58 11.30 2.94 66.93  
LAC   26.14 22.69 39.72 10.38   
MENA   25.96 6.84 20.37 11.64  35.54
SA   31.57 3.00 45.63 17.16   
SAf   36.82 18.00 30.37 15.04   
GI- Governance Indicators average. GIe – Estimated average 
EAP (East Asia  & Pacific), ECA (Europe & Central Asia), LAC (Latin America & Caribbean), MENA
(Middle East & North Africa), SA (South Asia) and SAf (Sub-Saharan Africa) 
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The latter is the most important variable in 
three regions, East Asia and Pacific, Latin 
America & Caribbean and South Asia, explain-
ing 47.3%, 39.7% and 45.6%, respectively, of 
the differences with high-income countries. 
For Europe and Central Asia and the Middle 
East and North Africa, the most relevant vari-
able is their institutional particularity, cap-
tured by regional dummies. In the first case it 
explains 66.9% of that difference, while in the 
second it represents 35.5%. 
 
Since the dependent variable is expressed in 
levels and the independent ones are in logs, 
the estimated parameters are not elasticities. In 
fact, elasticities are not constant, but depend 
(negatively) on each country institutional 
quality. That is, since. 
 
and per capita GDP (Table 11). Regarding 
regions, the largest elasticities belong to South 
Asia and Middle East and North Africa, and 
the lowest by far to Europe and Central Asia. 
Since these elasticities vary across countries, 
measures aimed at improving institutional 
quality would have different impacts according 
to each country current institutional quality 
level. 
 
6. Alternative institutional 
quality indicators  
 
In order to analyze the robustness of the re-
sults found, the same estimation has been car-
ried out. We have done it by using as depen-
dent variable the six GIs components and four 
 
Table 10. Elasticities of  institutional quality determinants (I) 
Income Level pc GDP Gini Taxes Education 
High 0.070 -0.199 0.192 0.088 
Upper Middle 0.100 -0.285 0.275 0.126 
Lower Middle 0.127 -0.363 0.349 0.160 
Low 0.151 -0.431 0.415 0.190 
i
i
i X
dXdIQ β=   (3) 
 
where Xi stands for variable i and βi represents 
its corresponding parameter, each variable 
elasticity is 
IQ
iβ . This value decreases as insti-
tutional quality rises. According to the pa-
rameters estimated, the highest elasticity is 
that of the Gini index for all income groups. It 
ranges from -0.42 in the poorest countries to -
0.19 in the richest (Table 10). Closely to Gini 
elasticities are tax revenue elasticities, followed 
by those of education and finally per capita 
income. 
 
The elasticities’ order is not altered by consid-
ering different regions: Gini, taxes, education  
alternative institutional quality indicators. In 
the first case, taxes are always significant, al-
though in one case at 90% probability. Per 
capita income is significant at least at 95% 
probability in five out of six indicators. The 
Gini index is significant in four of them. Edu-
cation is only significant at 95% probability in 
one case and in two cases at 90%, but only if it 
is considered an exogenous variable (Table 
12). Openness rate is never significant. Middle 
East and North Africa and Europe and Central 
Asia dummies are significant in four cases, 
though in two of them at90% probability for 
the first region. It is important to point out 
that two specific indicators (Corruption and 
Government Effectiveness) show infra-
identification problems at 95% probability, but 
not at 90%, while the Voice and Accountability 
estimation shows over-identification at 95%. 
 
 
Table 11. Elasticities of  institutional quality determinants (II) 
Geographic Location pc GDP Gini I. Taxes Education 
East Asia & Pacific 0.128 -0.363 0.350 0.161 
Europe & Central Asia  0.066 -0.187 0.180 0.083 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.093 -0.265 0.255 0.117 
Middle East & North Africa  0.130 -0.371 0.357 0.164 
South Asia  0.133 -0.379 0.365 0.167 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.114 -0.325 0.313 0.143 
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Table 12. Gobernance Indicators Components 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable  (a) (b) (a) (b) (b) (a) (b)  
GDP per capita 0.32  
(**) 
0.38  
(***) 
0.41  
(***) 
0.37  
(***) 
0.41  
(***) 
0.32  
(**) 
  0.41  
(***) 
Gini -0.92  
(**) 
-1.16  
(***) 
-1.13  
(***) 
-1.42  
(***) 
-1.40  
(***) 
   -0.74  
(**) 
Taxes 0.90  
(***) 
0.57  
(**) 
0.58  
(**) 
0.49 
(*) 
0.50 
(*) 
1.13  
(**) 
1.18 
(***) 
1.10 
(***) 
0.64 
(**) 
Education  0.35 
(*) 
 0.35  
(*) 
  0,49 
(***) 
0,58 
(***) 
 
Openness          
Middle East & N.  Afr. -0.50  
(*) 
-0.43  
(*) 
-0.43  
(*) 
   -1.39 
(***) 
-1.39 
(***) 
-0.46  
(*) 
Europe & Central Asia -1.11  
(***) 
-0.80  
(***) 
-0.78  
(***) 
-0.96  
(***) 
-0.94  
(***) 
   -0.31  
(**) 
Adjusted R2 0,76 0.79 0,77 0.77 0.77 0.38 0,70 0.72 0,67 
Nº Observations 72 79 88 79 79 120 84 84 100 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 
(χ2 (6) value) 
12.58 
(12.59) 
12.58 
(12.59) 
12.58 
(12.59) 
15.47 
(12.59) 
15.45  
(11.07) 
18.44 (c) 
(9.49) 
22.09 (c) 
(9.49) 
21.14 (c) 
(9.49) 
15.74  
(12.59) 
J statistic (χ2 (5) value) 5.17 
(11.07) 
8.50 
(11.07) 
8.88 
(11.07) 
7.35 
(11.07) 
7.60   (9.49) 3.66 (d)  
(7.81) 
8.00  (d) 
(7.81) 
7.48  (d) 
(7.81) 
7.66  
(11.07) 
(1) Corruption. (2) Government Effectiveness. (3) Rule of Law. (4) Political Stability. (5) Voice and Accountability. (6) Regulatory Quality. 
(a) Education is considered exogenous (b) Education is considered endogenous. When education is not significant is removed from the esti-
mations  
(***),(**) and (*),(***),(**) and (*), significant at 99%, 95% and 90%  probability, respectively 
(c)  4 degrees of freedom (d)  3 degrees of freedom   
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As alternative institutional quality indicators, 
the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 
(component Institutions), the Objective Gov-
ernance Indicators (OGI), the Corruption Per-
ception Index (CPI) and the Doing Business 
Indicators (DBI) were employed. Both per 
capita income and Gini index are significant in 
all of them at least at 95%; taxes are significant 
in two (GCI and CPI); education is only signi-
ficant in DBI, and only at 90% probability if it 
is considered exogenous; openness rate is 
never significant (Table 13). Europe and Cen-
tral Asia dummy are significant in all estima-
tions 
tions, and the Middle East and North Africa 
dummy in two (CPI and DBI). As previously, 
we did not find any other regional specificity. 
 
In sum, per capita income, income distribution 
and tax revenue seem to be robust determi-
nants of institutional quality. Education, by 
contrast, seems a less robust variable. Open-
ness does not seem to contribute significantly 
to institutional quality. In addition, Europe 
and Central Asia and the Middle East and 
North Africa appear to be the only regions 
showing institutional particularities (negative). 
 
 
Table 13. Determinants of institutional quality (alternative indicators) 
 GCI OGI CPI DBI 
Variable    (a) (b) 
Per capita GDP  0.27 (**) 0.35 (***) 0.71 (***) -18.01 (***) -20.30 (***) 
Gini Index -0.96 (**) -0.63 (***) -2.06 (***) 57.80 (**) 55.44 (**) 
Taxes 0.81 (**)  2.62 (***)   
Education    -19.02 (**) -14.43 (*) 
Openness rate      
Middle East & N. Afr.   -1.13 (*) 37.42 (**) 36.78 (**) 
Eur. & Central Asia  -0.79 (***) -0.53 (***) -1.85 (***) 37.32 (***) 35.71 (***) 
Adjusted R2  0,58 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.61 
Nº Observations 92 118 100 88 88 
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 
(χ2  value(5)) 
15.37 (c)  
(12.59) 
37.65 
(11.07) 
16.28 (c)  
(12.59) 
26.00 
(11.07) 
29.28 
(11.07) 
J Statistic (v χ2 value(4)) 5.92 (d) 
(11.07) 
4.98 
(9.49) 
5.70 (d) 
(11.07) 
1.59 
(9.49) 
1.55   (9.49) 
GCI: Global Competitiveness Index 2006 (Institutions). OGI: Objective Governance Indicators 
(2002). CPI: Corruption Perception Index 2006. DBI: Doing Business Indicators 2006 (rank) 
(a) Education is considered exogenous (b) Educación is considered endogenous. When educa-
tion is not significant is removed from the estimations  
 (***), (**) and (*), significant at 99%, 95% & 90% probability, respectively.  
(c)  6 degrees of freedom. (d)  5 degrees of freedom. 
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Conclusions  
In this paper, we have singled out the four 
characteristics that, in our opinion, define 
institutional quality: static efficiency, dynamic 
efficiency, credibility and predictability. Sub-
sequently, we investigated the determinants of 
institutional quality. The determinants under 
analysis were separated into two groups. One 
the one hand, those variables responding to 
"historical" features of countries, which are 
hardly malleable by government action such as 
colonial origin, geographic location, or legal 
tradition. On the other hand, those factors 
directly related to the aforementioned quality 
institutional characteristics. Our empirical 
research suggests that the quality of institu-
tions depends essentially on development 
level, income distribution, tax revenue and 
education. Development fosters good institu-
tions, thus creating a virtuous circle between 
growth and institutional quality. In addition, 
high-quality institutions are expected to de-
velop in equitable societies, with a strong fiscal 
contract an educated population. If these con-
ditions are met, then it is possible to build 
efficient, credible and predictable institutions.  
 
On the contrary, "historical" features either 
they do not seem to determine institutional 
quality or their effects are indirect, through the 
variables previously mentioned. Thus, accord-
ing to our results, variables such as legal tradi-
tion or colonial origin do not have any impact 
on institutions. Variables, as ethnic fragmenta-
tion or natural resource endowment do, but 
their impact is indirect; the former by affecting 
income distribution, the latter by decreasing 
tax revenue.  
 
In sum, our results suggest that the determi-
nants leading to institutional quality are not 
out of the reach of governments. Although it is 
not an easy task, there is room for policies 
aimed at improving the quality of institutions.  
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Appendix I. Data sources and description of variables 
 
Institutional Quality: 2006 World Bank Governance Indicators average  
 
Per capita Income: constant PPP per capita GDP. 2004 and 1990. Source: World Bank 
 
Gini Index:  Latest year available. Source: World Bank. 
 
Education: Average years of school for the population aged over 25 years. Source: Barro and Lee 
(2000): 
 
Taxes: The main source of homogeneous information on tax revenue is provided by the IMF 
through Government Finance Statistics, which, in turn, is used by the World Bank in World De-
velopment Indicators. However, both sources face two serious problems. On the one hand, the 
series are incomplete for many developing countries. On the other, data usually refer to central 
governments, which is inaccurate information in highly decentralized countries. Therefore, to 
overcome these problems several sources have been used. For Latin America, Gomez Sabaini 
(2005) has been employed, except for Venezuela, whose data corresponds to the World Bank. For 
the OECD countries, we used the data provided by this organization. For the rest of countries, two 
sources have been used. Firstly, the World Bank in countries for which data is available and reli-
able. The WB provides data from income tax excluding social security. Also, it provides separately 
data for the latter. Therefore, it has been proceeded to add them up. The University of Michigan 
World Tax Database is the second source used in countries for which the WB has no data 
(http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/) or is not reliable. Data year is 2000. Yet, in some cases, 
data was not available for that year, and we selected the closest year available, with a maximum 
difference of three years. 
 
Openness rate: exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. 2004. Source: World Bank  
 
Ethnic Fragmentation. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
Population: 2004. Source: World Bank 
 
Fuel: Percentage of fuel exports on total exports. 2004. Source: World Bank  
 
Geographic location: Latitude in absolute value of each country’s capital, divided by 90. Source: 
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2007 
 
Legal System: Origin of the legal system, English or French. Source: Reynolds and Flores (1989).  
 
Colonial Origin: own elaboration based on Bertocchi and Canova (2002)  
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